Introduction
An occasion a I thorough re\'iC\\ of the pro<:C!'~SCS. structures a no kgi!'ll~lth e ba!'lis of an industrial relations sy ·tem i~ v.ell worthwhile. and gi\'en th~ external CtHironment of 19X6. it i · C\en tnore wonhwhile. and well titned.
The re\'ie\\ j~ particularl) tin1ely given the clear concern of employers that a central feature of the system. agreen1en ts. are no longer resoh i ng d i!'lputes: gi\'en the concern of the trade union moven1ent that the system is not looking after the low p~1id: and given the markcJ change~ taking phtce in the organisation and oper~llion of economic and industry policy in Ncw Zealt~aH.I. No tna tter how worthwhile and 1 i mel) the review. i I must abo he \t~serted that it i!' l \\ rong tu presuppose th:tt rc-assc~sment and evaluation tnu~t ncccss~trily imply~~ need for radical cht~nge. l see no thing wrong with a careful ~v<duation which endorses the swrus quo. or a~ is my helicfof what is needed in the case before us. an endtHSL'I11Cnt of a process or fine-tuning and evolutionarv chane:e.
-.....
The assertion that the system is as it was when cstahl ished in 1 R94 , is line rhetoric. hut not sustai na hie by exa1n ina tion. The systern has been continuously d1.1ngi ng and I \\ ou ld argue that the changes which occurred in 1973 and in 19R4 were ~ignilicant changes.
As far as wage fixation is conccn1cd C\'idcnce seems to indicate that the sy!'ltem has not hecn al10\\ed to work. rather than that it won't work. Rather than evidence of systcn1 failure. there is evidence that failure ha!'l hccn \\ith the partie~ operating \\ithin the S)~tetn.
V..'e n1 ust applaud the resista nee to pressure to produce i 111 mediate and p<u1ia I change. A pa rtia I approach presents a danger ofhoth a ··knee jerk .. reaction. and ofignori ng tn<tny i m pot1a nt areas requiring scnttin) and evaluation. A further argument for c<tre. t1 ~lower approach. and for evolutionary change is that there is. at the n1on1cnt. an absence of consensus between the major p(tt1icipants. trade union:-;. employer!'~ and go\crnment. and possibly within the groupings themselves.
Change can be in1posed. but ceteris paribus it is the least desirable rnethod, it ought to be the last choice strategy. and I do not believe we have reached that point. I n an inappropnatc envirorunent and/ or at the wrong time. n1arked and radical change can lead to further division.
\\'e aH can take son1e cotnfort fron1 the fact that New Zealand is not unique in that it is questioning the fahriL· of its industlial relations systen1. Fund<1n1ental re\ iews of industrial relations ha\ e occurred in Britain. Canada and n1uch n1ore close. in space and titne. Australia. In fact. the 4uestioning. the review of pcrfonnance. has heen the nonn in the industrial relations ~)stems of lllO!'It \Vest ern den1ocracies.
. Corn pa rati ve research in the i nd ust1ia l rei a tion!'l of the \\estern dctnocracics clearly indicates
12 Kevin Hince that the pressures of the late 1960s-1970s was for reform based on the centralisation of industrial relations. epitomised by an emphasis on highly centralised bargaining structures. with greater focus on the rnulti-employer. and the national level ofbargaining. The most centralised approach being that of the .. social contract"" type.
In New Zealand legislative support for the national award and centralised determination continued during that period. and the registration provisions for voluntary settlement collective agreements provided for in the 1973 legislative changes resulted from a perceived need to bring fragmented bargaining within the formal centralised system. But at the same time there was an implicit acceptance of a need for greater individualism and diversity. In this area New Zealand was well to the forefront in sensing what was to become a trend in the industrial relations of the western democracies.
More recently the pressures for change in industrial relations have been in the broad directions of greater individual freedom and decentralisation of decision-making. In this sense there has been a change of emphasis from the general pattern of the 1960s and early 1970s.
Where there is explicit or implicit government agreement the process is proceeding faster (the USA. the UK): where pro rem government resistance exists the pace of fragmentation of bargaining structures is slower (e.g. Australia). Even in Sweden. for so long the epitomy of the centralised model. the epitomy of the tripartite. pluralist philosophy to wage determination and industrial relations generally. the acceptance of such a model has been seriously questioned. In this case it has been a challenge from the employers. first querying the system and then in 1984 refusing for the first tin1e to participate in the negotiations of a centralised national agreement Australia. with the Labour government. the ""Prices and Incomes Accord·· and the recomn1endations of the Hancock Report is the key case in the maintenance of a highly centralised model. It is against the contemporary trend. But there could be local variables. local cultural factors. etcs.: which make that an appropriate choice.
There is a choice for New Zealand. we could resist further change. But the fact that evolutionary change has been occurring in the approach to industrial relations. that pressures for decentralisation do exist from the market and from other sectional groups. suggest that the real question we should he approaching is the direction. extent and speed of future change rather than the con1plete preservation of the status quo.
I have forn1ed n1y own view of the general issues raised by the Green Paper. and on many of the n1ore specific issues of detail. On the general issues I argue that for the time being. in the i1nn1ediate future. developn1ents should centre on: First: A national award systen1. primarily focussed as a protection of minimum standards. and for goups which operate in areas of weak organisation. or as price takers/market followers. Second: Extensive and unrernitting encouragement both philosophic and legislative. for individualism and entrepreneurship in industrial relations. Inhibitions to independence of approach can be removed and procedures which facilitate such development enhanced. The emphasis must he on individualism and choice. Third: All of this ought to he done within a framework of a social unity of purpose.
I could elaborate on this third point. and argue a case for re-affirmation oftripartitism as the hest rneans of achieving a n1acro consensus. and a social unity of purpose. However. it is the second of these points that I want to develop. That is. the need for a rebirth of initiative. entrepreneurship. innovation. independence of approach in industrial relations. or to be blunL a re-appraisal of the notion of n1anagernent in industrial relations.
The real challenge of the Green Paper is not in the shape or form of legislative change ( in1portant as that will he). hut in how the policy n1akers. the managers. in private industry. and the public sector. approach the nutnagement of industrial relations.
Management and industrial relations
In recent years n1anagen1ent in industrial relations in New Zealand has essentially. generally. been reactive. It has been wrapped in a cocoon of protective legislation. a regulated industrial and econon1ic en vi ron tncnt. and when severe crises developed. the intervention of govemmenL either directly or through legislative an1endn1ent. was par for the course. This was a period where the practice of industrial relations was left to the specialist to the ··fire fighter". the troubleshooter. who would •nove frotn crisis to crisis. frorn one lengthy meeting in a smoke filled conference room to another. who would tnake endless telephone calls. often moving so fast that the messages could not catch up. It was seat oft he pants stuff: it was adrenalin pumping. moving from crisis tocri is. )n tno~t industrial rel(ttions sy~lCill!'i this \\as a period \\here the initit~ti\C~ were \\ith labour. and ''here the nHtnagcment of indu~trial relation~ \\as rcacti\c. The better doct11nentcd exceptions \\Cre the Scandinavian sy~ten1s \\here a posiivc upport for participative st) le of managcn1ent and for con~en us tripa rtitisn1 emerged as a dri' ing force.
But thing!'~ ha\c changed. the external en\ ironment in mo~t \\estern democracies has~ changed. anJ such change ha~ impacted on industrial relation~. and on the n1anagen1cnt ol industrial relations.
I n p a rt. t h is c h " n g e i ~ I i n k c d to t h c 1 n a r k c d i n c rca~ c i n co m p c t i t i ' e n c ~ ~. a n d t h c c h a n g c d nature of con1petition in the le~s regulated opcr~ttion<tl en\ irontncnt. Economic rece~~ion enhances this impetu~. In part it is linked to perceived excesses of miliwnt unionisn1 . spccilicall) militant political unionisn1. In p:trt it take~ succour from the more supportive political environtnent rcllected in the movctnent to the politicul right: a shift or emphasis \\hich i~ occurring at both I he level of nutional politics ~tnd at the grass roots or comn1unit) level. \Vithin this environment we arc witnc~sing ~~ rcassertion o f the notion or ·· thc right to nHtnage··. of ··tnilitant tnanagement··.
In a jingoistic style the change can be synthesised as fron1 rcacti\C to pro-acti\C. fron1 Jcfcnsi ve to offensi\'e. or fro 111 retaliatory to prc-en1 pt ive n1a nagcn1en t. And dose I) a~socia ted i the n1uch n1ore -ignificant and po~itive step of the fonnulation and pursuit of a corporate strategy in indu trial relation~ and hutnan re ource n1a1Htgcn1ent.
It is po ~ihle. from observations ofheha,iour in O\er~eas industrial relation~ ~)Slt~ms. to identify different types of strategic approaches hy 1nanagen1ent.
The first approach continues to seek <~ccoTnn1odittion with labour. \\ith union~. hut in so doing pursues positive new initi,ttivcs in th(lt relationship.
The movcn1ent to green field sites with prior negotiation of b1hour contract~ is one example. whiLh is a reaction against certain types ot' union action. hut tH)t a rejection or . . un1on tsm per se.
Key clements ofdc:al s of this kind (typified. perhaps. b) agrecmnents reached by JapanesL' fi n n ~ i n l he a u to m o hi I e a n cl c 1 e c t r o n i c s i n d us t ry i n t h c U n i t c d K i n g do n1 ) i n clu d c n c x i h lc u s ~ of labour. shop Ooor COibUltative processes. dispute~ procedures for both interest and rights disputes which involve no strike clauses and compulsory arhitr.ttion (in son1e instances the traditional fonn of arbitration. in others experin1entation \\ith ··pendulum .. or .. last offer .. arbitration). l)evelopn1ents in conce~~ion bargaining is another exan1ple ofnc\\ explorations within a traditional lahour-1nanagen1cnt accomn1odation process. Conccs'-lion hargainingcan itnolvc 2-ticr wage structures (I for existing cn1 ployees. I for new entrant~). or\\ age/job ~ccu ri t) tradeoffs. as well as tnore con\entional quid pro quo arrangements.
An extension of this type of strategy can also he observed. and c<tn be identilied as the d~\elopmcnt of" cotnmitmcnt ideology at the \\Orkplttce hut within'' unionised environment. A cotnmitn1cnt ideology i~ one where progran1tn~~ ~tre put in place to develop and emphasise areas of comn1on interL"'~t. and the developtncnt of mutual trust. Quality of \\ork-lifc program1ncs. en1ployee involvctncnt. gain ~haring. changed notions of accountability and a~sociatcd re\\ards. joh re-design and a change in ctnphasis fron1 hierarchical control to team building. arc all a~pects associated \\ith these dc,dopn1cnts. A point to he ernpha~bcd i~ that the ah,cncc of the union (or the castration oft he union) is not an essential prerequisite to developing commitment strategies. It n1akes it h<trder. hut a comrnitted n1ana1!en1ent can ~ucceed .
....
A second typr of n1anagen1cnt/ corporate stratcg) ohscn cd in action is that \\here managcn1ent by offen"i\ c action. seeks to isolate unioni~n1 fron1 the workplace. It doc~ thi~ by utili~ing a range of weapons including the law. outbidding union rates. intense anti-union public relation~ campaigns. and the removal of plant to green field ~ites on-~hore. or n1orc frc4 ucn t ly today. o ffs ho rc. The dcve lop n1e n t or a cotn tn it 111 c n t ideology. as refc rred to cad ier. has abo been part of i.t p<)sitive stnttegy in tn~tny in~tanccs geared to preclude. l)r minitnisc. unionis<ttion. An1L'riL·an hthl>ur relations have ~tlways had a strand of this type ofhehc:l\iour:
14 Kevin Hince today we are seeing an accentuation of such activity there. and the spread of these approaches in other western industrial relations systems.
The third type of management approach observed can be categorised as .. a planned offensive geared to achieve designated long term goals··. Significant examples of this type of management strategy in the United States include the actions by President Reagan in 1981 in response to a strike by air traffic controllers. In that instance of declaration of the illegality of the strike was followed by the abolition of the union by decree. mass dismissals and the recruitment and training of new labour. Similar strategies based on mass dismissals have been utilised in other cases since then.
Continental Airlines was the first (others have followed) to use bankruptcy law to facilitate dissolution of individual employment contracts and terminate union-management collective relationships. Operations then re-commenced with non-union labour and re-negotiated contracts. Increased use of franchising and labour sub-contracting have also been positive strategies utilised to restore control to managements.
In the United Kingdom. the corporate strategy developed by Michael Edwards at British Leyland was perhaps the first major thrust to re-assert management rights: to regain control by a planned militant management offensive. More recently we have witnessed the action of the National Coal Board establishing long term goals (the right to control. particularly in respect to plant closures and technology). and then pursuing that goal by a militant rna nagemen t strategy. The central issue of that bitter strike was one of power. of control. of the right to manage. But of greater significance it was an action carefully chosen. and thoroughly planned by management.
British Rail has since developed similar strategies. The most recent specific instance relates to a decision (after some years of failed negotiation) to abolish unilaterally guards on most services ... If a guards· strike takes place we will shut down the entire railway system·· .. was the management pronouncement. Management had made a decision to bear. if necessary. the brunt of major. costly. industrial disruption in pursuit of a longer term strategic gain. Confrontation. in both coal and raiL was seen as a way forward.
The cases of Eddie Shah and Rupert Murdoch in the British newspaper industry have been so well documented in the press that they need only a brief mention. But they are examples of this type of corporate strategy in industrial relations. However. the features of the Murdoch case: a windowless plant. barbed wire fortifications. massive police support. mass dismissals. take it or leave it negotiating. are such that they need be identified clearly so that you and I can assess whether such developments are worth the price.
In 1981 I pub I ished a study of industrial relations in the open-cut black coal mining industry of Central Queensland. A key finding of that study was that market and production technology contraints delineated the desired level of production and then the corporation. Utah Development Company. adopted a hard or soft line on industrial relations issues: that is. they settled easy or caused or took strikes. as and when required in order to regulate production to market requirements.
At that time I was subjected to severe criticism. criticism in the vein that this was not the way management behaved. and that such assertions were detrimental to the image of n1a nagemen t. More recent events. some of which I have just outlined. in the USA and the UK suggest that in certain circumstances n1anagement will chose to act in that manner. Militant management strategies are re-emerging or spreading. Management does have. and is exercising choice.
New Zealand has not been isolated from these developments. There are obvious cases of corporate concern and corporate strategic planning in the industrial relations/human resource field. And there are operational examples of each of the strategy options I have identified. But for n1ost of New Zealand industry the challenge lies ahead.
I have referred to 3 n1ain categories of corporate strategy for purposes of exposition (there are. of course. variations on those themes). I do have a clear unequivocal preference. I believe that tripartitisn1. the notion of unions. employers and government (representing the community interest) working together is a more effective way of achieving social progress. I believe in the working through of industrial issues by managers and the representatives of workers. I believe in the accon11nodation process.
My policy suggestions are therefore based on a continued social and industrial role for each of the parties working within a framework of mutual interdependence. mutual recognition and respect. and seeking to refine and enhance the accommodation proce s within a pluralist den1ocratic society. And herein Jie~thcin1portanccofthe()rccn Paperexercisc.ln a nubhell thcexcrci~ennlst produce a re~ult \\hereby attitudes change. rather than one wherein these attitudes harden. and positions hecon1c tnore entrcnL·hed.lfthc latter occurs. I hclic\C 1nanagen1ent v.ill n1ove more quickly to the second and third 1 1ype uf identified strategy.
lnline with rny choice of desired outcome. rny hope ofthc C'Jreen Papcrexen:ise is that it \\ill opt rorenhan.ced C\Olutional) Ch(lllgc. building on the changes\\ hich took place in lt)73 and 19X4. t\1) '-lingle. mo t in1portant polic) prescription is for 1nanagement to sho\\ initiati\e and entrepreneurship in industrial relation~ practice and (initiall)) to continue to ~eek accommodation with unions. Given the changed externalitie~. gi' en the Jesson of experience fron1 O\er cas S)Stenls. I believe a positi\c rcspon e \Vill occur in n1ost cases. I he1icvc the trade union n1o\en1ent ''iH adapt hy becon1ing. forcxample. more pragnultic and Je~· ideological. n1ore business than class oriented. n10rt: forward thinking. and n1ore profe sional. in research. organisation and oper<ttion~. It \\ill also en1crge as a stronger mo\emenl.
If the union n10\'eJncnt fail to respond generally. or in ·pecific instances. alternati\e ~trategies of isolating the union. or confrontation industrial relations. \\ill inc\ itabl) he chosen hy 1nanagcr~.
NO\\ that I have identified the need for strategic planning. a range of choice~. and 111) O\\ n first preferrcd choiCL'. I C4lll proceed tu refer hriL'Il). but more direct I) . to the (!rccn Paper ~tnd the associated debate.
The Green Paper

Son1e on1issions
The Green Paper is a comprchen i\e docurnent and the supporting volun1e 2. C\en 1norc so. There arc. hO\\e\er. several areas \\here the en1phasis i~ not as great as I hclic\e it hould he. I tnention 2 su\..'h areas. The first. is that of control in industr) and industrial relations.
The Federation of Labour submissinn to the rvtini~tcr prior to the 1clease or the Circcn p,lper argued (1 casc for a widening or the dclinition or industri~d matters. Question 13 asks .. should union and employers he free to determinL' for thcmsehes the scope of their negotiations'? ... But the FoL argument goes further and raises the issues of process-·· . . . the traditional sacred cow of'tnanageJnent prerogative···. sa) the J~oL . .. is as inappropriate a~ it is outmoded ... The Fol. paper introduces a need for concept~ of indu~trial den1ocn1c). Extensions of participator) roles involving unions arc ndvanced in respect of the introduction ofne\v technology. n1ergcr~ and takeovers and in the area of health and safet) . But the broad debate about participation of \\Orkcrs and/ or unions in decision n1aking is. unfortunately. not raised in the Green Paper. neither in tern1s of a philosoph) of operation. or the context of procedures.
There is no doubt in mv n1ind that these arc critical industrial rdations issues: the J Federation of Labour has raised them. how central and significant the) arc to that hod) on I) the Federation of La hour can an~" cr. hut if experience frorn overseas is a basis for prediction. they Inust be addressed. if not now. then soo1:.
Econonlic contexr
The second n1ajor omission of the Green Paper itself. but not of the debate which is surrounding consideration of the Green Paper. is the econo1nic context ofindustrial relations. and of industrial relations deci ions and outcorncs.
The en1pha~is of the Green Paper is on structure. process and the role of individuals. organi ation5 and the legislation a sociated with these. It is only through the general Que tions 1 and 2 related to the policy objectives. and the outcon1es oft he ~ysten1 that we ha\'c. by in1plication. an invitation to debate the econo1nic context of the operation. both objectives and outcome. oft he sy~ tcn1. The concern for outcomes. cspecia lly cconon1 ic oulcornes. is only in1plicit in the balance of the docluncnt. At I east 3 i g n i fi c < 1 n t e con om i c d i m c 1 L ions of t he de hat c c (1 n h c ide n t i fie d for consideration. First. the i1npact on the supply (ltHl dcml1nd for labour. especially at lhe A second economic dimension of the debate warranting consideration is the macroeconomic effects of industrial relations settlements emerging from different processes on the general level of prices. employment. industrial performance. and economic growth. Are centralised or decentralised decisions more or less compatible with low inflation. lower unemployment. high economic growth? A third economic implication of industrial relations reform is the costs of changed patterns of industrial disruption. And here the costs can be real money costs or they can be the costs of opportunities foregone.
Expertise need be brought to bear on the issues. debate must take place. Personally I advocate a rekindled emphasis on tripartitism as an appropriate forum for debating the sort of issues I have raised and in particular for debating the economic context from which industrial relations cannot be divorced.
At this point I turn to consider some of the specific issues raised by the Green Paper .
The arbitration court
There has been a slow but definite evolution in the role of the Arbitration Court within the operation of wage fixing and industrial relations in New Zealand. In recent years. the process has been one which has taken the Court from a high. central profile in wage fixing to a more significant role in procedural. interpretative and application disputes.
I believe the Court should continue to evolve more in the direction of a Labour Court wherein a wider range of labour law and employment-related issues can be resolved. A Labour court would maintain the existing jurisdiction of disputes of rights. personal grievance hearings. and selected disputes of interest issues. It could also assume control of selected areas of law (injunctive powers. actions in tort. for example) used in labour disputes. hut currently in the jurisdiction of other courts. A Labour Court could also integrate the roles of conciliation councils and the mediation service as various tiers within a co-ordinated operational structure.
The Labour court would then exist to serve the needs of the principal parties. not to be intrusive in its own right. not to be present by statutory power. but available at the request of participants to aid and facilitate problem solving. A non-interventionist philosophy would encourage greater independence. operationally and procedurally. of the parties. Weaker participants may lean more heavily. stronger participants would be more prone to work out their own solutions. A distinction between awards (procedurally before a conciliation council) and agreements (independent of conciliation) would disappear. Conciliation and arbitration facilities would he available on request.
Career developn1ent. career structure. specialisation of the staff as well as support services would each he enhanced by an integrated structure. A separate discussion document would be needed to add flesh to this proposed development. And the expertise of others need to be added to mine to fully explore the nuances of such a body. I introduce the concept and some key operational principles.
The n1ediation sen'ice
The Mediation Service pre-dated the 1973 legislative distinction between disputes of interest and of rights. and intially its role was to emphasise prevention as well as cure: rights and personal grievance rather than interest disputation: and mediation rather than arbitration. Over tirne the reality has diverged from expectation.
The work of the n1ediators and the mediation service is not per se being criticised when I suggest that reality he recognised. and the de facto integration of role become an actual integration. In fact I have argued earlier for a single administrative structure. a Labour Court encon1passing rnediation. conciliation. arbitral and selected judicial functions. Regisrra 1 ion/a 1nalga n1ation
The notion of union rt:gistration is one which has been central to the New Zealand way. It ha served as an essential protection forth~ C"oncept ofunionism. and a key recognition by the State of the legitirnacy of unions. Monitoring of union rules. tninitnal protection of democratiC" fonn and clen1ents of protection oft he rights ofindividuaL vis-n-vis the union are subsidial)'. but important. henclits of registration proces es.
A related quest ion is whet her his to ric rights given upon regis tra tio n. excl usivc , C"ove rage. for exan1ple. are still appropriate. I would suggest that minin1al requirernent \vould be a tatutory prohibition on the registration of .. new" craft or occupational unions. ren1oval of any inhibitions and the provision of positive encourage1nent. when.~ possible to cunalgarnation and rationalisation of unions along industry lines.
A rnajor change ~ugge~ted hy son1e is that there should be a legislative rcquiren1ent for the fonnation of alternative groupings of worker. at plant. site. locality level. forexcunple. Such a course would create increased potential for inter-union connict and n1cn1hership battle . a feature of industrial relations we can do without. The initial choice nHl) be a ballot between unions for representation on a ite: but it will only be a n1atteroftime before a third option. no union. appears. and the way is then open for the overt anti-unionism campaigns observed in sorne industrial relations systcn1s. but in recent years not a ignific~tnt feature ofNcw Zealand . SOCletv.
"'
If lower levels of bargaining structure are tn tkvdop. and need he supported b) organisational change within unions. n1y preferred options are: first to allO\\ unions to evolve structures which union 1nernber consider appropriate (legi lation '' hich inhibib change hould be re1noved. encouragement applied where pOS$ible ). Secondly. to cncou rage initiative by en1ployer to in turn encourage additional structures to en1erge h) enhancing the potential of the existing provisions for con1positc agree1nents. and the further dcvclopn1ent ofindu try wide agreen1ents.
The appointn1enl of full tin1c officer . . perhaps initially with support funding fron1 govern n1en t. by centra lu n ion organisations and by loca It rade cou nci Is. would he an enli rely appropriate way to encourage the formation of inter-union groups to fonnulate and proccs~ policy claims in the fonn required hy the cornposite site or indu~try ·wide agreetnents. Such oflicers could chair and co-ordinate at the union level. and assist in the processing of ~uC"h 1natters at the ncgotiaLing intcrfac~.
I-sues associated with union amalgatnation have a dose link to those involved in the di cussion of registration . ..-rhe questinns are ::-;hould arnalgan1ation be pron1otcd and. if so. \\hal are the major constraint '?Three poinb. leaving the judgrnent 10 he made hy the reader: first. research has den1onstrated that people. especially union officers. are a key ob tacle to amalgarnation. Policy provisions n1u t accept this. LegislatiH~ change is not enough. Secondl). auen1pts to force arnalgamation can lead to resistance b) on1e of those affected. and the j~sue of the residual or breakaway. the srnall group remained to fight the S)Sten1 will ha\e enhanced potential. Finally. and I think ofn1ost significance. tight legislative control of \\hat i a union. how it should he structurrd. hov. it should operate. 1neans that we have union · that arc creatures of the ysten1. born of and serving the systern. And I believe that such a trade union n1oven1cnt. which to so1ne extent has and continue to operate in Nc'' Zealand. is not in the long tenn interests of union rnember~ or of industrial relations generally.
The track union n1ovetnent is geographic~tlly fragmented. UIH.ler-finanL·ed and underresourcecl. and much of this is a produC"l of historical dependence on a highly regulatory systcn1. \Ve can not reverse historic-al patterns overnight. but further legislative direction would con1pound the faults oflhe past and create fur1hcr dependencic ·. \Ve should restrict our interference to encouragement. to remove re~trictions. to facilitate the directions chosen hy those at the gras roots of the n1ovcn1ent. the union n1embrr~.
Disputes of rights and disputes of interest
The introduction of this dichoton1y in the 1973 Act and the developn1ent of processes and structure~ hased on this dichoton1y (plus the related notion of the personal grievance procedure) were innovative changes. I believe this distinction is sound. The iclentilication of? categories of disputes. the establishrnent of the tenns and conditions of ctnployrnent on the one hand. and the adn1inistration and interpretation of those agreed tenns on the other hand. Kevin Hince is a significant distinction.
The clear distinction between interests and rights has been one of the success stories of the North Arnerican industrial scene. in Scandinavia and continental western Europe. Britain is one bargaining system where the dichotomy was not maintained. and the experience there is not one to be en1ulated.
There has been a long. and as yet unsuccessful. quest for an acceptance oft he distinction in Australia. The Hancock report is the latest to make a plea. Recommendation 103 reads: ·ahat a distinction be drawn between interstate industrial disputes which lead to the making of awards. and disputes which are subsequent to the making of an award .. :· Recommendation 106 reads: .. That the legislation require all awards and certified agreements to contain a procedure for the resolution of grievances during the currency of the award on certified agreement ... Australia 1986-a recommendation-it was implemented by legislation in New Zealand in 1973. I am aware of the Federation of Labour position that the distinction is occasionally blurred. and that it restricts trade union action. I accept this as an initial policy position of a trade union seeking to maximise freedom of action and maintain the initiative in industrial can1paigns. However. I would suggest that unions have much to gain in terms of organisational stability if they can distinguish approaches and roles of officers based on this dichoton1y as a central. if not immutable. principle.
A clear. defined. role for an appropriately trained local union officer (the delegate) in the processing of disputes of rights is a significant building block of a strong grass roots organisation of that union. It also has benefits for the employer in the improved potential for settling the disputation as close as possible to the source. The balance is strongly in favour of retaining the distinction.
Clearly steps can be taken to enhance the working of the existing system. There is a strong view favouring stronger encouragement for the parties to define their own procedures. borne out of and shaped from local needs and conditions. Again this is something which can be encouraged by legislation. but which can only take off at the initiative of the parties.
Local procedures could also enable the parties to make their own (local) provisions for private mediation/ arbitration services in rights disputation. Mutual acceptability. specific knowledge. in1n1ediate availability would be criteria the parties could bring to the selection process. Individuals or panels could be provided for in the agreed procedure.
Whilst there may he a sound philosophical. as well as economic. rationale for a private service based on a shared user-pays concept. it may be that. given the long history of dependence on the state. that a central fund may be needed to undeJWrite such ventures. Such a fund would din1inish in importance as the intrinsic merits of the proposal develop. and as the union n1ovement (as it must eventually. and preferably sooner rather than later) increases its resource base.
Lf'ngth and duration of awards
I would argue that the I :2 month rule is a sound initial attempt to create a climate of stability for those who exchange rights and obligations under awards. In fact there are cogent arguments for supporting the development of innovative bargaining which extends the life of awards or agrecn1ents. Longer tern1 documents. with agreed contingency provisions (escalator clauses. agreed and specified re-opening provisions etc.) ought to be encouraged.
Whilst the legislation can guide and encourage in this area. and it should not inhibit. it is the parties who need to be innovative. Again an argurnent that the existing system needs oiling rather than rad ica I reforn1 u Ia tion.
Independent contractors
Question II asks whether the definition of .. worker .. should be widened to include ··labour only contractors ... There is also the issue (not explicit in Question II) of the person who contracts for labour and the provision of equipment (a truck. a vacuum clearner. a computer. The Green Paper refers to 1he debate in tcnns ofecono1nic efliciency versus the potential ~or under-cutting awards. We should also recogni~c that one of the major tactical uses of independent contractors in overseas situations h'ts been in association with legislation prohibiting secondary action (secondary boycott~. sympathy slrike . for exatnpk). in combatting restrictive picketing. and in overt strike breaking. Also pre ent in the e situations has been an increased use of the general court sy~ten1 (via injunctive action. and actions in tort) as a weapon in indu trial disputation.
In n1y view the answer to this question n1ust sten1 fron1 a value po -ition and an under tanding of the intent of the initiating party. Honest attcrnpt to in1provc cornn1ercial efficiency rnay need to be supported. occasional and judiciou~ usc of the injunction and irnilar civil actions 1nay have specific rok~ in specific instances as a lcgitin1ate tool in the armoury of the industrial relations negotiations. But the en1phasis is on intent. on the hone ·t attempt. on the occasional and judicious use. If the intent is. and I argue from the extrenu~. to so weaken unionisrn as to render it ineffective. and to substitute "judicial'· nonns for industrial nonns in dispute re olution.then I would regard it as inappropriate in the society in which ' I live. and hence must be re~bted.
Because intent can only he appreci<~ted on a ca~e b~ case h~tsis the initial position would need be detennined by reference to past experience and then n1onitored over tirne. ReL"ent British and Arnerican experience uggests that independent contractors have been used to ubvert unionisn1. l\1y initial po ition is that labour law nHJSt be extended to cover such developn1en ts.
Conclusion
I have sought throughout the paper to identify son1e key policy i~sues '' hich need to he confronted. I have also nHtde sorne sugge tions for L"hange in 1nicro dernents of the S)Stern. 1 have raised the 4uery tlutt the alleged f<1ilure of the ~ystern h"s been less due to any inherent weakness in the systcn1 than in the approach and attitude of the parties. I have takt:n a poli~y position that. for the titne being. a national award syslL'I11 need remain. that continuing eva lu t i o n a ry c h a n g c is the way a h e a d. a n d t h '~ t the en co u r a g e m c n t o f i n it i a t i v e. i n d i' i d u < d i ~ m and entrepreneurship in industriHl relations planning and practice. is essential.
1 would add J further ugge tion which should facilitate developn1ents: (I) First. the need for a dear taten1ent of intent. A key. intrin -ic but often overlooked clause in any agreernenl en1erging bel\\een unions and n1anagen1ent in a rnature bargaining relationship is the "staternent of intent ... That staten1cnt repre ents an agreen1ent on the purpo e. objectives. hopes and mnhition. that the parties have for the contract. It is al ·o a critical staten1ent for tho e who con1c afterward and ha\e to administer and interpret the contract. In that case it provides guidance and enlightenment and enable~ adn1inistration and interpretation of the document lo enhance the relationship rather than undennine or contradict that relationship. Perhaps the key thing in a review of the industrial relations ~ysten1s is in fact a ··~taternent of intent'". both in tern1s oflhe goals of society and the .goals of the industrial rt:lations syster:n. Que~tions I and 2. enhanced by questions about basic goals of society. are an exL"ellent starting point. But for all of its merits the question is whether the process of (t Green Paper. ~ubrnissions. position paper. legislation. is now the appropriate proces to identify an agreed statcrnent of intent. Shouldn't there be Ht this slage. soon. a rnuch more i nten~ive. open. face-to-face i nvolve1nen l. negotiation. between the principal actors . unions. employers and govern n1cn t (in the role of reprcsen tativc of the electorate)? If" e can get agrcen1e1H as to the .. staternent of intent'" so n1uch else wiH follow.
(2) A second point intended to facilitate the operation of the systt:n1 is n1ade unashan1edly. despite its advocacy of a vested interest. hy a vested intere~t. Fir t. there n1ust be n1ore and better re earch in respect of labour 111arket issue . and econd. there n1ust he n1ore and better industrial relations training of the operators within the systern.
I could. if called upon. enunciate the need for. the role of. the structure of. and the OIH?.oi rH.! ..._ ~ benefits which would now fron1 the establishment of a designated agency charged with. inter alia. co-ordinated a ncl ongoing re ea rc h in to 1 a hour 111 a rkct. ccon on1 ic an ct so cia 1 issues. Such an agency could he an extension of exi ~ting organisations. within~~ goven1n1cnt departrnent
